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This paper develops a model of pricing and advertising in a matching environment
with capacity constrained sellers. Sellers￿expenditure on directly informative adver-
tising attracts consumers only probabilistically. Consumers who happen to observe
advertisements randomize over the advertised sellers using symmetric mixed strate-
gies. Equilibrium prices and pro￿t maximizing advertising levels are derived and their
properties analyzed, including the interplay of prices and advertising with the market
structure. The model generates a unimodal (inverted U-shape) relationship between
both, individual and industry advertising level, and market structure. The relationship
results from a trade o⁄ between a price e⁄ect and a market structure-matching e⁄ect.
We ￿nd that the decentralized market has underprovision of advertising, both for in-
dividual sellers and industry wide, and that entry is excessive relative to the e¢ cient
level. We present a quantitative analysis to highlight properties of the models and to
demonstrate the extent of ine¢ ciency.
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11 Introduction
We analyze the equilibrium relationships between advertising, pricing and market concen-
tration in a market in which there are frictions. The market has N identical consumers and
M identical sellers. Each consumer wants to buy one unit and each seller wants to sell one
unit of an indivisible good. Each seller must advertise in order to be known to consumers.
Each advertisement contains location, capacity and price information.1 Based on the ads
observed, consumers select one and only one seller with whom they want to trade. Then
all trades occur at the advertised prices. Frictions arise in this kind of market from the
fact that sellers have a capacity constraint, and consumers are uncoordinated in decisions
to select a particular seller. The implication is that a particular seller might be selected by
more then one consumer, in which case all but one consumer faces rationing. Models of this
sort, but without explicit costly advertising have become known as markets in which sellers
choose their price and probability of service. Examples of such models include Peters (1991),
Deneckere and Peck (1995), and more recently Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001)2.
This paper uses the framework of Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), but modi￿ed to
include the more realistic feature of explicit advertising choices by sellers. It is assumed that
adverting is costly and that ads sent by sellers are observed by each consumer probabilistically
as in Butters (1977). Without advertising (and consumer search), sellers would not be able
to sell, and the market would not exist. The general idea conveyed by Butters (1977)
advertising technology is one of "hit and miss" feature of advertising. The interpretation is
that each consumer may not truly pay attention to the advertisement. Common examples
are consumers who trash mailbox ￿ iers before reading them, or uses television advertising
time during a program to do something else. Therefore, when sellers send advertisements,
only a fraction of consumers will get to observe at least one of the ads, and hence the returns
on advertising expenditure is probabilistic.
We investigate how this type of advertising is in￿ uenced by equilibrium prices and by the
consumers to sellers￿ratio, which we refer to as market concentration.3 In models of price
and probability of service, the extent of frictions is in￿ uenced by the consumers to sellers￿
ratio. We are interested in how advertising and pricing are in￿ uenced by the presence of
frictions, as well as how advertising in this environment a⁄ects the matching rate.
The model is simple enough to allow for the derivation of the closed form for the equi-
librium advertising level, prices and matching rate, as a function of market concentration.
Since we assume homogeneity on both sides of the market, all sellers choose the same level
of advertising and pricing, and all consumers use the same mixed strategy over sellers from
whom they have observed at least one ad.
1This is a model of directly informative advertising. For a recent survey on di⁄erent forms of advertising
see Bagwell (2001).
2Some models exist assuming competition in auctions using reserve prices such as McAfee (1993) and
Peters and Severinov (1997). There are also models applied to the labor market such as Ciao and Shi (2000)
and Julien, Kennes and King (2000).
3Competitive intensity is measured by the number of sellers relative to the number of consumers. Since
all sellers and buyers are homogeneous groups, it is reasonable to measure concentration this way.
2We ￿nd that equilibrium advertising is in￿ uenced by equilibrium market price positively
as intuition dictates. Higher price makes costly advertising more worthwhile. But the mag-
nitude of the impact depends on the market concentration. Markets with substantially less
sellers then consumers (concentrated), yields a larger impact of price on advertising level then
markets with substantially more sellers then consumers (competitive). This occurs because
the equilibrium price is concave in market concentration (convex in the number of sellers).
We also ￿nd equilibrium advertising to have a unimodal relationship with market concentra-
tion. Advertising per seller, and at the industry level reaches its peak for intermediate values
of the ratio of consumers to sellers. For extreme values of the ratio, advertising converges
to zero. Therefore for very slack or tight markets, advertising is found to be minimal. In
other words, it suggests that peak advertising would be observed in oligopolistic markets.
This result is driven by the nature of the matching environment. The derived matching
function implies that for a given number of consumers, the probability with which a seller is
visited by one consumer is lower when either there are numerous or a small number of sellers.
The former is obvious since numerous sellers implies a very low probability a consumer will
select a particular seller. Hence, it makes advertising less worthwhile. In the latter case,
when there are too few sellers, the probability with which a consumer will select a particular
seller is high, meaning that each seller is more likely to be visited by several consumers.
Hence, no need to advertise much. There exist a good body of empirical literature empha-
sizing the causality that concentration in￿ uences advertising showing signi￿cant non-linear
relationships, inverted U-shape, between concentration and advertising, as reported in the
extensive survey from Bagwell (2003). Buxton, Davies and Lyons (1984) and Uri (1987)
also provide empirical support for an inverted U-shape relationship especially for industries
where a greater proportion of sales go to ￿nal consumers. In our model, all sales go to ￿nal
consumers.
This paper is closely related to Butters (1977). We use his advertising technology and
also assume a unit demand for each consumer. However, Butters (1977) does not have capac-
ity constraint and our consumers are strategic, using mixed strategies in selecting sellers. In
fact, introducing limited capacity along with an endogenous matching technology to analyze
equilibrium advertising intensity is what di⁄erentiates this paper from all the literature.4.
Stegemen (1991) essentially extends Butters￿ s (1977) model to the case of consumers het-
erogeneous reservation values and assume large number of buyers and sellers. Stahl (1994)
considers ￿nite number of buyers and sellers and allows for downward sloping individual
demand curve and a general advertising technology. He considers the in￿ uence of consumers
to sellers￿ratio on the price and advertising distributions. He ￿nds, as in this paper, that
more sellers imply lower prices, but less advertising per seller, as opposed to a unimodal
relationship. The models of Stegemen and Stahl do not have capacity constraint also. These
three models su⁄er from the standard non-existence in pure strategy equilibrium in prices
for sellers due to the fact that sellers￿ s payo⁄s are discontinuous when prices are equal.
4Our model is also suitable for analyzing competition in sales (advertised price discounts) with limited
advertised supply (e.g., sale until supply lasts). However here, capacity is exogenous.
3Hence, they resort to mixed strategy equilibrium in prices, generating price dispersion as a
consequence. The matching environment assumed in this paper alleviated this discontinuity
problem and allows for unique symmetric equilibrium price to be derived. Finally, none of
these papers show an unimodal in￿ uence of concentration on advertising, which is a main
contribution of this paper.
Remarkably Butters (1977) has shown advertising to be e¢ cient in his model. Stahl
(1994) also ￿nds advertising to be e¢ cient when considering a unit demand as in our model.
Here, as in Stegemen (1991), we ￿nd underadvertising relative to the e¢ cient level. Moreover,
we show how this result extends to the industry level of advertising. The main reason
for ine¢ cient advertising is well known in search models. On one hand the search cost
(advertising cost) is born entirely by sellers while the bene￿ts are shared by both consumers
and sellers upon a match. This induce less than socially optimal advertising. On the other
hand, there is a business stealing e⁄ect when a seller sets a lower price then others, and this
externality generally tend to cause excessive advertising. Butters (1977) ￿nds that these two
e⁄ects cancel, while the search cost dominates in Stegemen (1991) and Stahl (1994). We ￿nd
in this paper, with limited capacity and endogenous matching, that search cost also dominate
to create underadvertising relative to the e¢ cient level for any market concentration levels.
Furthermore, we show that there is excessive entry relative to the e¢ cient level. Finally, we
show how an entry tax and an advertising rate subsidy can induce e¢ ciency of advertising
and entry within a balanced budget.
The following sections are organized as follows: Section two presents the basic model with
consumers and sellers￿choices. Section three assesses the e¢ ciency of advertising and entry.
Section four considers a numerical simulation of the model. A discussion and conclusion
follows.
2 The Model
The model consists of a large number M of identical sellers each carrying only one unit to sell,
and a large number N of identical potential consumers each with a unitary demand. We refer
to the ratio of consumers to sellers ￿ = N=M as the market tightness or size-concentration5.
The number of sellers M and consumers N is assumed common knowledge to all sellers and
consumers. However, we assume that sellers know also each others￿ s identity, but consumers
do not know sellers￿identities. Each seller must advertise in order to be known to consumers.
They do so by sending a number of ads or messages, s, and each consumers observe the ads
only probabilistically. Each consumer has interest in purchasing from a particular seller if
and only if he has observed at least one ad from that seller. Consequently, the advertising
5Reference to ￿ as market tightness is more commonly used in search models of the labor market using a
matching function. In this paper we refer to it as size-concentration. The reason is as follows. Let ￿i be each




index has the property that if the ￿rms are identical, in this model ￿i = 1=M for all i, then the HHI = 1=M.
Then we refer to ￿ = (HHI)N as a measure of market concentration. One can also use the C1 = 1=M
concentration ratio to form ￿ = C1N.
4rate is de￿ned as a = s=N. Each ad only contains information about location/identity and
price for the seller. We assume that the product features are common knowledge and focus
on search goods and directly informative advertising, abstracting from issues of advertising
as a signal of quality, product related informational asymmetries and persuasive advertising.
The structure of the model is described by the following sequence of events:
1. Each seller i chooses jointly an advertsing rate ai = si=N and a price pi to maximize
expected pro￿ts, taking as given other sellers￿ s choices.
2. Each seller i sends a number of ads si in order to reach and attract N consumers. Each
ad contains the seller￿ s identity, location and price information pi.
3. Each consumer observes at least one of the ads from each particular seller with proba-
bility h = h(ai) given the advertising rate ai chosen from that seller based on a given
number of consumers N. This probability is common knowledge and will be explicitly
derived in the next section.
4. Upon observing locations and prices from a set of sellers￿ads, each consumer selects
one and only one particular seller i from which to purchase with probability ￿i(p),
where (p) is the observed price vector from a set of sellers.
5. Whenever matches are formed, transactions are performed at the advertised prices.
In order to solve the model, we focus on symmetric equilibria in which all sellers choose
the same price and advertising rate, and consumers select over sellers using mixed strategies.
This particular structure implies a tradeo⁄: consumers try to minimize competition at a
seller, but sellers try to maximize it. In other words, consumers select over sellers trading
o⁄ a price and a probability of trade.
2.1 Advertising Technology and Consumer Choice
In this section we derive a typical consumer￿ s choice. We assume that consumers know the
total population of sellers, M, but do not know the identity or location of any particular
sellers, and hence, the availability of a product and price, until they have seen ads from
them. A consumer￿ s choice is then a selection of a particular seller from which to purchase
an item once it has observed at least one ad. However, we assume that not all sellers￿ s ads
are observed by consumers. In order to capture this feature we adopt a speci￿cation of an
advertising technology based on the model of Butters (1977). Assuming that each consumer
observes an ad or a signal with probability 1=N, then (1￿1=N) is the probability to observe
no ads. If a seller send a number of ads s, then (1￿1=N)s is the probability to observe none
of the s ads sent by a seller. Since we focus on large markets, taking the limit of (1￿1=N)s as
N and s go to in￿nity but keeping the ratio s=N ￿xed, the probability with which a consumer
does not observe any of the s ads is e￿s=N. Therefore, the probability to observe at least one of
5the s ads from a particular seller is (1￿e￿s=N). Using the advertising rate a = s=N, we write
h(a) = (1￿e￿a) and note that this probability is independent of advertising rates performed
by other sellers. This seems natural in the context of directly informative advertising where
it only conveys information about a particular seller￿ s identity, location, price and possibly
other informative features. This advertising technology is only one way to represent how
sellers search for consumers. It also considers consumers as passive in the sense that they do
not take any actions to increase the probability to observe a seller￿ s advertisement. Although
we could introduce costly consumers search, for example by allowing them to sample more
communication media, or simply searching for prices as in Robert and Stahl (1993), we focus
on search intensity on the sellers￿side. This is equivalent to assuming that the net bene￿ts
of searching for sellers is negative for consumers. This may be explained by high opportunity
cost of search such as work hours and/or home production.
The immediate implication of introducing an advertising technology is that each consumer
j gets to observe at least one ad, and hence, prices from a set of sellers mj ￿ f0;1;:::;Mg.
Let #mj be the cardinality of the set mj. If #mj = 0 consumer j recieved no ads at all and
is Uninformed. If #mj = 1, consumer j has observed ads from only one seller so he is captive,
implying ￿j(p(mj)) = 1. When consumer j observes ads from several sellers, #mj > 1, he
is selective and uses a mixed strategy. Since mj is private information to consumer j, for
any vector of advertising rates a, using the probabilities h(ai) for each seller i, one obtains











(1 ￿ h(a‘)): (1)
Consumer j￿ s strategy consists of selecting one and only one seller with probability





i(p(mj)) = 1. That is consumers use mixed strategies over their set of known
prices. The probabilities !(mj;a) can be used to form a discrete probabiltity distribution
over the possible mixed strategies ￿
j
i(p(mj)) 8mj ￿ f0;1;:::;Mg. From this distribution











where (p;a) = (p1;:::;pM;a1;:::;aM). This probability simply represents the fact that
￿j(p(mj)) used by each consumer j is private information, and hence, ￿
j(p;a) is the expected
mixed strategy of consumer j. Symmetry on the consumers￿side implies ￿
j(p;a) = ￿(p;a)
for all j and any vectors p and a.
When selecting a particular seller i 2 mj, a consumer needs to assess the probability with
which other consumers select seller i. This probability depends on how many other sellers
6these consumers have observed as captured by the probabiltiy ￿(p;a). This probability
also depends on the vectors of advertising and prices. However, consumers do not observe
the vector of advertising rates a and may not get to observe the overall price vector p.
Letting p(M) = (p1;:::;pM) be the overall price vector, then p(Mnmj) is the set of prices
not observed by consumer j. Therefore, any other consumer who has observed a price pk 2
p(Mnmj) will select seller k with positive probability and the actual price set by seller
k will in￿ ence the mixed strategy they use. Consumer j must form expectations about
advertising rates, but also about unobserved prices based on his set of observed prices. That
is, a consumer forms the following expectations E(p(Mnmj)) = ~ p(Mnmj) and E(a) = ~ a
which he uses to evaluate the probability with which other consumers observe and select
a particular seller i. For example, a consumer who has observed seller i 2 mj and selects
this seller with probability ￿
j
i will make the following calculations about other consumer ‘￿ s



























(1 ￿ h(~ a‘)) and p(mj \ m‘) is the price vector com-
monly observed by any two consumers j and ‘, and ~ p(m‘nmj) is the vector of prices observed
by consumer ‘ and not by consumer j, but has formed expectations over it.
Under symmetry and assuming rational expectations ~ ￿
‘
i(p(mj);~ p(Mnmj);~ a) = ￿
‘
i(p;a) =
￿(p;a) for all ‘ and for all i.
Assuming that each consumer extracts a utility value normalized to 1 from consuming
the good, the consumer surplus from selecting seller i is (1 ￿ pi). Since each seller carries
only one unit of the good to be sold, the rationing rule is such that when several consumers
select the same seller, each one get the good with equiprobability. Consumers￿selections and
the rationing rule translate into a probability ￿
j
i to get served which depends on the number
of other consumers also selecting seller i.
A consumer j￿ s expected utility from selecting seller i is
U
j
i (p;a) = (1 ￿ pi)￿
j
i(p;a): (3)
We focus on mixed-strategy equilibrium selection for consumers. (See Burdett, et al.
(2001).) The mixed-strategy equilibrium selection is such that a consumer is indi⁄erent
between selecting any two observed sellers. For any given vectors of prices and advertising
rates (p;a) set by sellers, a mixed-strategy equilibrium selection for any consumer j = 1;:::N







i (p;a) = U
j
k(p;a) (4)




i(p) = 1. Unlike the model of Burdett et al. (2001),
advertising generates a distribution of these equilibrium mixed strategies.




















is the rationing rule.
To simplify this probability, consider the probability that a consumer is alone selecting
seller i, which occurs when ni = 0,
Prfni = 0g = (1 ￿ ￿i(p;a))
N
and the probability of not being alone selecting seller i is









The probability to get served at seller i is the probability that at least someone has seen the
ad and selects seller i, (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿i(p;a))
N, times the probability to "win" the item 1
N￿i(p;a),
6Since probabilities sum to one








n(1 ￿ ￿)N￿1￿n = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)N￿1
is the probability that at least one other consumer observes the ad of a seller and selects that particular











































8where N￿i(p;a) is the expected number of consumers who have observed and selected that
seller.




￿i(p;a) = 1 ￿
M Y
i=1




(1￿h(ai)) simply re￿ ects the possibility that a consumer observed no ads
at all. If all sellers set the same advertising rate a then
M Y
i=1
(1 ￿ h(ai)) = (1 ￿ h(a))M.
Suppose now that a deviant seller sets price ^ p while all other sellers set price p, but all
sellers set the same advertising rate. This yields ^ ￿ + (M ￿ 1)￿ = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ h(a))M and the
probability with which a consumer oberves and is expected to select any of the non-deviant
sellers is ￿ =
1￿^ ￿￿(1￿h(a))M
(M￿1) .
The expected utility from observing and selecting the deviant seller is








Similarly, the expected utility from selecting a non deviant seller is














A symmetric, mixed-strategy, equilibrium selection ^ ￿(^ p;p￿1;a) solves:
U(^ p;p￿1;a) = ^ U(^ p;p￿1;a) (9)
However, explicit solutions for ￿(p;a) is characterized by a polynomials of high degree and
cumbersome to handle.7 Fortunately, the explicit solutions are not needed for the equilibrium
derivations. All we need is the conditions under which a mixed strategy equilibrium selection
exist. It can be shown that as long as the price deviation is not too small or not too big,
there is a unique ^ ￿ 2 (0;1) that makes consumers indi⁄erent between the deviant seller and
the non-deviant seller.8
7This property of ￿(p;a) is particular to the use of a posted price mechanism. When using auctions or
ex post bidding, these probabilities have explicit solutions (see Julien, Kennes, and King (2000, 2005).
8See Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) for a demonstration of the conditions.
9Lemma 1 The unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium when pi = p￿ and ai = a￿ for
all i is ￿
j￿
i = 1=mj for all j and for all mj 2 f1;:::;Mg.9
In a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which all sellers choose the same advertising




In this model, we focus on mixed strategy equilibrium in order to capture the feature that
consumers￿decisions are uncoordinated. While coordination is a more probable behavior in
small markets, in large markets this is unlikely and harder to implement. This is equivalent to
assuming a communication technology constraint preventing consumers from coordinating on
their selection strategies. In this model there are pure selection strategy equilibria. But the
implementation of these equilibria would require a coordination technology that we assume
away here.
2.2 Equilibrium Prices and Advertising Rates
Equilibrium market price
Each seller jointly chooses its price and advertising rate simultaneously to maximize
expected pro￿ts, taking as given other sellers￿ s choices, and expected consumers￿behavior.10
In order to be active on the market, each seller must incur a ￿xed cost F 2 [0;1], which may
or may not be associated with advertising as in the cost of setting up a selling location.11
Each seller faces a variable cost c(a) for an advertising rate of a, with constant marginal
cost, that is c0 > 0 and c00 = 0. The expected pro￿t for a seller is
￿(p;a) = pq(p;a) ￿ c(a) ￿ F (10)
where q(p;a) =
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(p;a))N￿
is the probability of sale. Sellers use the probability
￿(p;a) to derive the probability of sale since they do not know consumers￿exact mixed
strategies. Finding the symmetric equilibrium market price involves solving a set of M
reaction functions. Instead we use the technique in Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) which
9
For a proof of this Lemma see Burdett et al. (2001).
10McAfee (1994) considers a two￿ stage game theoretic model where ￿rms choose advertising ￿rst and
prices in the second stage. However, for a model considering simultaneous choices see Robert and Stahl
(1993).
11Fixed costs associated with advertising are sunk costs. Advertisements are costly to set up, or more
generally a marketing campaign needs preparation. However, even for industries where ￿xed costs associated
with advertising may not be present or even minimal, the ￿xed cost we introduce can be taken as ￿xed cost
for a seller to be on the market, such as cost of setting up the shop/location. Given the constant marginal
cost assumption, there are economies of scale in advertising. This is consistent with existing communication
technologies.
10is to assume as above that all sellers but one set a price p and advertising rate a, while a
deviant seller sets price ^ p. The objective of a deviant seller is
max
<^ p>
^ ￿(^ p;p￿1;a) = max
<^ p;a>
f^ pq (^ p;p￿1;a) ￿ c(a) ￿ Fg, (11)
where now q (^ p;p￿1;a) = (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(^ p;p￿1;a))N). Consider ￿rst the pricing decision,
























@^ p . The second-order condition is satis￿ed since q(^ p;p￿1;a)
is concave in ^ p. Assuming ^ ￿ 2 (0;1), di⁄erentiating (9) with respect to ^ p and inserting the













M2 (1 ￿ p)
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(M + (N ￿ 1)(1 ￿ (1 ￿ h(a))M))
￿ < 0:
(13)



















The equilibrium price in ￿nite markets depends on the advertising rates. It is easily
shown that p￿(M;N;a) is strictly increasing in a, meaning that higher advertising rates by
all sellers translates into a higher equilibrium market price. This simply means that if all
sellers choose more advertising, they choose a higher price in equilibrium to generate the
expected revenue to compensate for the extra advertising expenditure. In large markets the
equilibrium price p￿ (M;N) converges very quickly to
p
￿ (￿) = lim
M;N!1
p




which is the same limit price found by Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001). Therefore, in large
markets, the in￿ uence of advertising on equilibrium prices becomes insigni￿cant as one would
expect.
11Properties of the equilibrium market price





￿ (￿) = 0 and lim
￿￿!1
p
￿ (￿) = 1: (16)
Furthermore, p￿ (￿) converges quickly to its limit value of 1. For instance a value ￿ = 10 is
enough to have p￿ (￿) very close to 1. Since we have an equilibrium market price determined
by concentration, we can de￿ne the elasticity of market price with respect to concentration




￿ , which is always positive, along with properties that ￿ (￿) is strictly
decreasing in ￿, with lim
￿￿!0
￿ (￿) = 1 and lim
￿￿!1
￿ (￿) = 0. These properties indicate that as
the market becomes less competitive, higher ￿, the equilibrium market price increases and
this price becomes less sensitive to a further decline in competition. In other words, with a
large consumer to seller ratio, an exit by one seller will not have much of an impact on the
equilibrium price. However, when such a ratio is small, an exit by one seller creates a bigger
impact on the equilibrium price.
Equilibrium advertising rates
Each seller now chooses an advertising rate ^ a, given their choices of price p, and taking
as given all other sellers choices of advertising rates a￿1 and prices p, to solve:
max
^ a
￿(p;^ a;a￿1) = max
^ a
fp(￿;a)q(p;^ a;a￿1) ￿ c(^ a) ￿ Fg
where q(p;^ a;a￿1) =
h
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(p;^ a;a￿1))
N
i















which is the standard marginal revenue equals marginal cost of advertising rate. Note that
@q(p;^ a;a￿1)
@^ a = N (1 ￿ ￿(p;^ a;a￿1))
N￿1 @￿(p;^ a;a￿1)






@^ a ￿(p(m)) =
￿(p;a)h0(^ a)
h(a) > 0, meaning that a higher advertising rate by a seller increases the probability
to be observed and selected, but not the conditional probability to be selected once the
consumer has observed at least one ad, that is ￿(p). This is the nature of informative
advertising. Here, once a consumer has observed at least one ad from a seller, a higher
advertising rate cannot induced consumers to change their mixed strategy ￿(p) in his favor.
If we were to allow for this e⁄ect, advertising would need to have a persuasive element.
The ￿rst-order condition yields the reaction function
@p(M;N;a)
@^ a




0 (^ a): (18)
12The second-order condition is satis￿ed since h(a), and hence q(p;a), are concave in a.
Under symmetric equilibrium p = p￿ and ^ a￿ = a￿ for all M with ￿(p￿;a￿) =
1￿(1￿h(a￿))
M ,
where p￿ is de￿ned in (15). Assuming a total cost of advertising of c(a) = ￿a, and using


















This is the standard condition equalizing marginal private bene￿t (MPBa) and marginal
private cost (MPCa) for optimal advertising rate. The pro￿t maximizing advertising rate









The pro￿t maximizing individual advertising rate is driven by the equilibrium market price,
p￿, the probability with which a consumer will be captive, ￿e￿￿, and the marginal cost of
advertising, ￿.
Properties of the equilibrium advertising rate











< 0, for all ￿. (22)
Sellers choose advertising to maximize expected pro￿ts being cognizant of the equilibrium
price to result in the market as a function of concentration ￿. Hence, a￿(￿) is strictly











(p￿ (￿)￿e￿￿ + ￿)2 < 0: (23)
All else constant, a higher equilibrium price is associated with higher advertising rate. As
one would expect, a higher price makes it more worthwhile for a seller to spend more on
advertising. The strict concavity of a￿ in p￿ implies that continual increases in price brought
about by other factors than market concentration would require less and less increment in







￿(￿) = 0 (24)
13As the market looks like the perfectly competitive one (￿ ! 0), the equilibrium price con-
verges to zero which calls for zero advertising. Sellers in this model are required to perform
advertising in order to have a chance to make a sale. But the model￿ s outcomes do converges
to the standard perfectly competitive outcome with no advertising and equilibrium price
equals marginal cost which is zero in the model. On the other hand, as the market looks like
a monopoly (￿ ! 1), advertising converges to zero.
In order to demonstrate further properties of a￿(￿), note that in large markets the equi-
























R(￿) = 0 and lim
￿￿!1
R(￿) = 1: (27)
These properties imply that the equilibrium expected revenue for each seller is convex for
all ￿ ￿ 1 and concave for all ￿ ￿ 1.12 Using the expected revenue properties, the pro￿t




0(￿) + ￿) ￿ ln￿: (28)
where R0(￿) is the marginal expected revenue from a change in concentration which turns
out to be equal to the probability with which a seller faces only one consumer after choosing
a price and advertising rate. The following proposition summarizes the ￿nal property of
advertising rate.
Proposition 1 The pro￿t maximizing advertising rate a￿(￿) is unimodal (inverted U-shape)
in ￿, and reaches a maximum at ~ ￿ > 1.
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@￿ (1 ￿ e￿￿) + p￿(￿)e￿￿, where the ￿rst term is the increase in equilibrium price each seller will get
if they make a sale when ￿ increases (lower M). The second term is the equilibrium price lost if a seller does
not make a sale.







￿(p￿ (￿)R0(￿) + ￿)
[￿(￿) + ￿(￿)] T 0: (30)
It follows that since
p￿(￿)R0(￿)
￿(p￿(￿)R0(￿)+￿) > 0 for all ￿, the sign of
@a￿(￿)
@￿ has the sign of [￿(￿)+￿(￿)].
There exist a ~ ￿ > 1 such that ￿(~ ￿) + ￿(~ ￿) = 0 and hence
@a￿(￿)
@￿ = 0. For all ￿ 2 (0; ~ ￿), it
implies that
@a￿(￿)
@￿ > 0 and ￿ > ~ ￿,
@a￿(￿)
@￿ < 0. Note that ￿(￿) > 0 for all ￿. For ￿ < 1, R(￿)
is convex and ￿(￿) is positive, hence
@a￿(￿)
@￿ > 0. For ￿ = 1, R(￿) is at an in￿ exion point and
￿(￿) = 0, so
@a￿(￿)
@￿ > 0. For ￿ > 1, R(￿) is concave and ￿(￿) < 0. However, ￿ needs to be
negative enough to change the sign of ￿￿(￿). The advertising rate reaches a maximum, at
a￿(~ ￿), which can only happen when R(￿) is concave, or when ￿(￿) is negative, then ~ ￿ > 1.
Therefore, for all ￿ 2 (1; ~ ￿],
@a￿(￿)
@￿ > 0.
What explains the unimodal form of a￿(￿) in ￿ is the relative magnitude of how the
equilibrium market price and the expected marginal revenue change with concentration.
The price e⁄ect is always positive as shown by the elasticity ￿(￿). The expected marginal
revenue e⁄ect however is unimodal in ￿ as measure by ￿(￿). Basically, the expected marginal
revenue e⁄ect is determined by the probability to face one consumer only by a seller. As
the market is relatively fragmented, an increase in concentration yields a higher probability
to face only one consumer by a seller relative to the probability to face many. But the
probability to make a sale is driven by the probability to face at least one consumer. In
such case, it is worthwhile for a seller to increase advertising intensity to maximize expected
pro￿ts. For relatively concentrated markets, an increase in concentration yields a lower
probability of facing only one relative to the probability of facing several consumers. In such
case, their is less need for advertising and advertising intensity decreases in concentration.
It is informative to decompose further the marginal revenue e⁄ect which depends on ￿
and e￿￿. Clearly an increase in ￿ induce a higher marginal revenue e⁄ect. However, the
probability with which a seller does not make a sale, e￿￿, decreases with ￿. For concentration
values ￿ 2 (0;1], both e⁄ect work in the same direction to increase a￿(￿). The important
impact of reduction in competition on equilibrium market price and marginal revenue makes
it worthwhile for each seller to increase advertising intensity. For concentration values of
￿ 2 (1; ~ ￿], the marginal revenue e⁄ect is negative but not enough to warrant a decrease in
advertising intensity. For concentration values below ~ ￿, the reduction in probability of no sale
for each seller from a reduction in competition is not important enough, inducing each seller
to increase advertising intensity in order to boost the probability of sale. However, for values
of ￿ > ~ ￿, the marginal revenue e⁄ect is more important, meaning that reduced competition
warrants a decrease in advertising intensity. Essentially, when competition is less intense, as
measured by a smaller number of sellers relative to consumers, the probability to not make
a sale as the number of seller decreases becomes important. This happens because there are
already a relatively small number of seller. Since the decrease in probability of not making
15a sale becomes less important, and the probability to be visited by several consumers get
higher, there is less need for each seller to advertise, and hence a lower advertising intensity
is performed.
Basically, there is a trade o⁄ between an incentive to increase advertising driven by
equilibrium price increase, but an incentive to advertise less since there are less sellers and
the probability of no sale decreases. For low concentration markets, the price e⁄ect is more
important. Sellers have an incentive to advertise more to compensate the marginal reduction
in probability of no sale. Advertising rate increases in concentration. Eventually, the number
of seller gets relatively small and the equilibrium price increases but not by much, while
the probability of no sale becomes more important. In highly concentrated markets, the
reduction in probability of no sale dominates, hence less need to advertise. Advertising rate
decreases in concentration.
There is an interesting alternative way to highlight the unimodal aspect of advertising
intensity relative to concentration which could be more suitable for empirical testing, and is
also useful to demonstrate the properties of the industry advertising rate. This is summarized
by the following corollary.








a￿(￿) be the market concentration elasticity of advertising rate, and ￿(￿) = ￿
R00(￿)
R0(￿) be a
relative measure of the curvature of R(￿). Then
￿
￿(￿) = ￿(￿)[￿(￿) + ￿(￿)] T 0 if and only if ￿ S ~ ￿
where ~ ￿ solves ￿(~ ￿) + ￿(~ ￿) = 0.

















￿(￿) = ￿(￿)[￿(￿) + ￿(￿)]:
Estimates of ￿￿(￿) becomes possible. First, one can estimate the number of consumers N.
Then, given that ￿rms are symmetric, their respective market shares are ￿ = 1
M, and the
Her￿ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is also 1
M. Therefore ￿ = N(HHI). For very small HHI,
large ￿, the market looks like a monopoly while for very large HHI, small ￿, it looks like
perfect competition. Estimates of ￿(￿) and ￿(￿) from historical data can be obtained for
a particular industry characterized by capacity constraint and product homogeneity. Using
the derived properties of expected revenue, we ￿nd that ￿(￿) = 1 ￿ ￿, allowing an estimate
for the marginal revenue e⁄ect of a change in market concentration.
16The relationship between concentration and advertising has long been the focus of empir-
ical work. The attempt was to explain a positive linear relationship between concentration
and advertising by positing a causation that advertising intensity in￿ uences concentration.
After the 70s, empirical work also focused on reverse causation, that concentration in￿ uences
advertising suggesting a non-linear relationship, quadratic inverted U-shape, between con-
centration and advertising intensity. There are many studies reporting signi￿cant non-linear
such relationship as reported in the extensive survey of the advertising literature by Bagwell
(2003). Although some studies do provide little support for a non-linear relationship, more
recent work, Buxton, Davies and Lyon (1984) and Uri (1987), emphasize industries in which
a large share of sales go to ￿nal consumers. They show how the signi￿cance of the inverted
U-shape pattern increases across industries with the increasing importance of sales to ￿-
nal consumers. Our model provides a theoretical implications leading to a causation that
concentration in￿ uences advertising intensity and all ￿nal sales go to consumers. Hence,
the model may provide some theoretical underpinning for these recent empirical studies by
providing a possible interpretation of the inverted U-shape relationship.
2.3 Industry Advertising Rate
This section derives the industry advertising rate and its properties. Since a is the individual
advertising rate, the industry advertising rate is determined by
A









￿ (￿) = lim
￿!1
A
￿ (￿) = 0: (32)
These limits have similar interpretations as the ones for individual advertising rates found
previously. The impact of concentration on the industry advertising rate is summarized by
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The industry advertising rate is unimodal in ￿ reaching a peak at ￿ ￿ < ~ ￿.




A￿(￿) be the concentration elasticity of industry advertising rate, then
￿ ￿
￿(￿) = (￿
￿ (￿) ￿ 1) R 0 if and only if ￿
￿ (￿) R 1 (33)























￿ (￿) ￿ 1) R 0 (34)
17Therefore, ￿ ￿￿(￿) reaches a maximum for a value of ￿ ￿ such that ￿ ￿￿(￿ ￿) = 0. This happens
when ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿
= 1. Since ￿￿(￿) reaches a maximum at ~ ￿ > 1, it implies that ￿ ￿ < ~ ￿. The
industry advertising rate reaches a peak at a lower value of ￿ then the individual advertising
rate.
The direction of a change in concentration on the industry advertising rate depends on
the concentration elasticity of individual advertising rate. The additional e⁄ect via ￿ in the
denominator of A￿ (￿) a⁄ects the properties. For any values of ￿ either lower then ￿ ￿ or higher
then ~ ￿, both individual and industry advertising rates move in the same direction following
a change in ￿. However, for all values of ￿ 2 (￿ ￿; ~ ￿), they move in opposite directions. This
means that for these values of ￿, the industry advertising rate is negatively related to a
change in ￿, while the individual advertising rate is positively related to a change in ￿. For
instance, this implies that as competition increases, more sellers lower ￿, leads each seller
to reduce their advertising rate. But more sellers doing slightly less advertising rates still
yields higher industry advertising rate. This ￿nding suggests that one must be careful in
aggregating individual advertising rate properties to the industry level, or to infer individual
￿rms￿ s behavior with respect to advertising from industry level data.
2.4 Equilibrium Advertising Rates and Prices under Free Entry
Until now, we have not allowed new sellers to enter or exit in response to positive or negative
net expected pro￿ts being realized in the industry. Assume that sellers can enter or exit the
market freely until expected pro￿ts are driven down to zero. However, in order to enter, a
seller must advertise and incur set up and variable costs of advertising. Under free entry,
pro￿t maximizing advertising rates become equilibrium advertising, because upon entry,
a seller knows that it must choose a￿ such that market concentration including himself
is determined by ￿. Using the equilibrium market price p￿(￿) and the pro￿t maximizing
advertising rate a￿ (￿), the equilibrium expected pro￿t upon entry is:
￿
￿ (￿) = R(￿) ￿ c(a
￿ (￿)) ￿ F
Under free entry, ￿￿ (￿
￿) = 0 de￿nes the value of market concentration, ￿
￿. Using




￿) + F (35)
yields the free entry individual equilibrium advertising rate a￿ (￿
￿) and equilibrium market
price , p￿ (￿
￿). With appropriate substitution, the industry equilibrium advertising rate is
A￿(￿
￿). In Section 3 we compare these equilibrium values with the e¢ cient ones.
An increase in marginal cost reduce the free entry individual and industry advertising
rate as shown by 22 and ??. Totally di⁄erentiating (35) evaluated at ￿
￿ it is easily shown
that
d￿￿
dF j￿￿ > 0:A higher ￿xed cost increases ￿
￿, and hence, reduces equilibrium entry. Since
marginal cost does not a⁄ect expected revenue we also ￿nd that
@￿￿(￿￿)
@￿ < 0:For all values of
￿
￿ > 0, an increase in ￿ increases total cost and reduces pro￿t, increasing ￿
￿ and inducing
18less entry. Finally, from the comparative statics, as F ! 1, ￿
￿ ! 1, the market shuts
down, and hence no advertising. When F ! 0, ￿
￿ ! 0, the market converges to the perfectly
competitive outcome with no advertising.
2.5 Interplay of Advertising Rates and Prices
Given that each seller choose ads and price simultaneously, there is an interesting synergy
between the two variables. Basically, a seller chooses ads to grow consumers attention as
shown by
@￿(p;^ a;a￿1)
@^ a > 0, but once consumers have sellers attention, sellers choose prices to
￿ght for selection, as shown by @^ ￿
@^ p < 0. Equilibrium advertising and prices are directly and
indirectly related in this model. We have found the pro￿t maximizing advertising rate to
be directly increasing in equilibrium market price. But also, advertising rates and prices
are indirectly related via market concentration. In this model, advertising intensi￿es price
competition when considering an increase in the number of sellers, each advertising a positive
amount. This is determined by the extensive margin of advertising rather then the intensive
margin. When more sellers advertise, consumers are more likely to observe ads by more
sellers increasing the number of sellers over which consumers randomize. More sellers on
the market doing advertising, at whatever levels, implies that the equilibrium market price
declines due to intensi￿ed price competition.
Since equilibrium market price is strictly increasing in ￿ and individual advertising rate
is unimodal in ￿, as market concentration changes, equilibrium market price and advertising
rate do not necessarily move in the same direction. This is summarized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 In relatively low size-concentration markets as measured by ￿ < ~ ￿, equilib-
rium market price and advertising rate move in the same direction following a change in
market concentration. However, in relatively high size-concentrated markets as measured by
￿ > ~ ￿, equilibrium market price and advertising rate move in opposite directions following
a change in market concentration.
This proposition suggests that to establish an association between simultaneous changes
in equilibrium market price and pro￿t maximizing advertising rate, one must consider the
existing market concentration, and whether the price and advertising movements were trig-
gered by changes in market concentration.13
This implication may shed some light on prior empirical research and ￿ndings investigat-
ing the association between price and advertising. Prior ￿ndings that price and advertising
are moving in opposite directions when concentration changes holds in this model for mar-
kets where the number of consumers is relatively high compared to the number of sellers,
that is for relatively high concentration markets.14 Similar implications carries over to the
13Note that in reality changes in market price may also result from collusive behavior.
14For such studies see See Benham (1972), Cady (1976), Comanor and Wilson (1979), Haas-Wilson (1986)
and Steiner (1973).
19industry rate of advertising in relation to the equilibrium market price with the exception
that the threshold is now ￿ ￿ instead of ~ ￿.
2.6 Equilibrium Matching
In this model, consumers and sellers are matched by equilibrium choices that they make.
Because of the advertising technology, there two ways to look at the equilibrium matching
rates. One is to consider the matching at the beginning of the game, that is the matching
rate between the total number of sellers M and consumers N given the equilibrium price
and advertising rates. The equilibrium number of matches in ￿nite markets given advertising
rate and equilibrium price decisions are made is:
￿






￿(p￿;a￿) is increasing in a￿, it implies that more advertising yields a higher expected
















Interestingly, the large market equilibrium price and matching rates are the same wether
or not advertising is introduced in the model (see Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001)). Hence,
results of competitive matching models are robust to the implicit introduction of advertising,
or more speci￿cally, to a form of informational asymmetry, where the number of oberved
sellers is private information to each consumer.
Under free entry, the equilibrium number of matches is simply expressed as ￿￿ (￿
￿). In
the next sections, we derive the e¢ cient advertising rates, with and witout free entry, as
well as the e¢ cient level of entry which we call ￿
￿
. As a consequence, the e¢ cient number
of matches without free entry, ￿
￿ (￿), and the e¢ cient number of matches associated with




, are obtained and compared to the equilibrium levels.
3 E¢ ciency of Advertising Rates and Entry
The e¢ ciency of advertising rate is assessed by considering the social planner￿ s problem. We
assume that the social planner chooses the individual and industry advertising rate without
15For properties of this matching function but without advertising see Julien, Kennes and King (2000)
and Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001).
20being able to resolve the matching coordination problem and take as given the matching
function derived above and the advertising technology. This yields a constrained e¢ ciency
measure. In this model, the planner￿ s objective is to maximize the total surplus, that is the
di⁄erence between the expected number of matches and the total cost of producing those
matches.
3.1 E¢ cient Advertising Rates
Without free entry, the e¢ cient individual advertising rate for each seller maximizes the












￿ Mc(a) ￿ MF
o
(38)
The ￿rst-order condition yields













￿￿ = ￿; (40)
which equates marginal social bene￿t (MSBa) and marginal social cost (MSCa).The e¢ cient























The e¢ cient advertising rate as the same limit properties as the equilibrium one. However
it di⁄ers as expressed by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The e¢ cient individual advertising rate is unimodal reaching a maximum
at ￿ = 1.







(1 ￿ ￿) R 0 if and only if ￿ S 1:
Therefore, the socially e¢ cient individual advertising rate is also unimodal in ￿ and reaches
a maximum when ￿ = 1.
21Since it has been established earlier that ~ ￿ > 1, then a
￿(￿) reaches a maximum at a
lower value of ￿ then a￿(￿). The explanation for the unimodal feature of e¢ cient individual
advertising rate is similar to the pro￿t maximizing one, with the exception of no price e⁄ect.
At the industry level, the socially chosen advertising rate is A
￿ (￿) = Ma
￿ (￿) = N
￿ a
￿ (￿)













Once again, as the market shuts down, ￿ ! 1, e¢ ciency calls for no advertising to be per-
formed. However, when the market converges to a perfectly competitive one, e¢ ciency calls
for a maximum industry advertising rate. The reason lies fact that even though the market
looks like a perfectly competitive one, each ￿rm must advertising, even a small amount, to be
known by consumers, with the implication of having a huge number of ￿rms each performing
minimal advertising rates. The relationship between e¢ cient industry advertising rate and
market concentration is summarized in the following proposition.








￿ be the market concentration elasticity of e¢ cient indi-








￿ the market concentration elasticity of e¢ cient
industry advertising rate. Then A






















































It remains to show that ￿
￿ (￿) < 1 for all ￿. Taking the second derivative of a
￿(￿) with


















for ￿ 2 [0;1]. This implies that for ￿ 2 [0;1], a














@￿ < 0. Hence, ￿
￿ (￿) < 1
and ￿ ￿
￿ (￿) < 0 for all ￿. Therefore, A
￿(￿) is strictly decreasing in ￿.
22The e¢ cient industry advertising rate is not unimodal, but strictly decreasing in ￿,
despite the fact that a
￿(￿) is found to be unimodal in ￿. Furthermore, A
￿(￿) reaches its
highest value as ￿ converges to 0. For values of ￿ > 1, an increase in competition, increasing
M, decreases ￿, and increases a
￿(￿), both contributing to increase A
￿(￿). However, for
values of ￿ < 1, any increases in M reduces the e¢ cient individual advertising rate. But, the
increase in M always dominate the decrease in e¢ cient individual advertising rate, generating
a higher e¢ cient industry advertising rate. In such cases, maximizing total surplus for a
given market concentration implies taking into account the positive externality associated
with advertising.
Under limited entry, the e¢ cient individual advertising rate a
￿ (￿) relative to the in-
dividual pro￿t maximizing rate a￿ (￿) for all values of ￿ is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 6 For all ￿nite market concentration value 0 < ￿ < 1, there is underprovision








Furthermore, the extent of ine¢ ciency diminishes as ￿ increases.




















8p￿(￿) < 1: This condition holds for all 0 < ￿ < 1 since p￿(￿) = 1 only in the limit as ￿














As ￿ increases, the equilibrium market price monotonically converges to 1, which implies
that the ine¢ ciency of advertising rates becomes less important, that is
￿
a
￿ (￿) ￿ a￿(￿)
￿
diminishes.
For ￿nite market concentration values, underadvertising occurs because of the sharing
rule upon a match, the equilibrium market price, is lower than the value of a match, which is
one. Since the social and private marginal cost of advertising are the same, this is observed
using equations (20) and (40) to express the di⁄erence social and private marginal bene￿ts:
MSBa ￿ MPBa =
￿e￿￿e￿a
(1￿e￿a)(1 ￿ p￿(￿)) > 0, for all p￿(￿) < 1, which holds for all ￿ < 1. In
this model, when ￿ goes to in￿nity, the market shuts down. The equilirbrium market price is
such that sellers bear the full cost of searching (advertising) but get rewarded by a fraction
of the entire surplus from a match, which is one.
233.2 E¢ cient Entry
With free entry, the social planner now takes the socially chosen individual advertising rate,
a
























































with the ￿rst-order condition:
￿



































Equation (46) fully characterizes the e¢ cient level of entry ￿
￿
, and hence M
￿, where the
left hand side is the marginal social bene￿t of entry (MSB￿) and the right hand side the
marginal social cost of entry (MSC￿).
The ine¢ ciency of entry summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 For a given number of consumers N, the free entry equilibrium number of
sellers is higher than the e¢ cient one, that is, M




Proof. We must show that ￿
￿
> ￿
￿. Note ￿rst that from the left hand side of (45),
MSB￿ has the same functional form as R(￿) which is the marginal private bene￿t of entry
(or MPB￿). It must be then that that entry is dictated by marginal cost of entry. From the




while the marginal private cost is MPC￿ = ￿a￿(￿) + F. For any values of ￿ 2 (0;1) it
follows that:











From Proposition 6 we know that a
￿(￿)￿a￿(￿) > 0. For ￿ ￿ 1, clearly MSC￿ > MPC￿.
For ￿ < 1, it can be shown that the inequality also holds. A numerical example is provided
in a further section. This implies that at ￿
￿










￿. Hence, at the e¢ cient level of entry,
￿rms are making strictly positive pro￿ts. Under free entry, entry occurs, reducing ￿, until
￿
￿ where R(￿




24In addition to a higher advertising rate for all concentration levels as shown above, the
e¢ cient entry takes into account of how entry a⁄ects each seller￿ s advertising cost as shown




@￿ . These two e⁄ects lead to a marginal social cost of entry to be superior
to the marginal private cost of entry for all concentration levels. Since social and private
marginal bene￿ts are the same for each concentration value, there is excessive entry.
This result shares a similarity with the ine¢ ciency of entry in Mankiw and Whinston
(1986). Their model is a standard oligopoly industry and di⁄ers from this one in that they
do not have capacity constraint, no matching environment, no advertising, consumers have
a downward sloping demand, and each ￿rm has more then one unit for sale. They show
that excessive entry occurs when the following three conditions are satis￿ed: (1) postentry
equilibrium aggregate output rises with the number of ￿rms entering and approaches some
￿nite bound as entry converges to in￿nity, (2) output per ￿rm fall as the number of ￿rms
increases, what they refer to as business stealing e⁄ect, and (3) for any number of entrants,
equilibrium price is weakly above marginal cost of production. They argue that the busi-
ness stealing e⁄ect drives a wedge between social and private incentives to enter and yields
excessive entry.
Although this model di⁄ers greatly from theirs, their three conditions apply to our model
with the following interpretation. Since each seller in the model has only one unit and no
production capability, interpret aggregate output as aggregate expected output as deter-
mined by the expected number of matches postentry, that is once price and advertising rate
are chosen. The expected number of matches is M(1 ￿ (1 ￿
1￿(1￿h(a))M
M ))N in the ￿nite
markets. It is easily shown that this term is strictly increasing in M and converges to zero
(a ￿nite bound) as M goes to in￿nity. This is equivalent to condition (1) of Mankiw and
Whinston (1986). Second, showing that the probability to make a sale for each seller falls
as the number of sellers increases is equivalent to condition (2). This holds for the following
reason. When a new seller enters and advertises, it increases the expected number of sellers
from which a typical consumer observes advertisements. Hence, each consumer randomizes
over more sellers, inducing a lower probability to visit each particular seller, reducing the
probability for a seller to make a sale. This is the business stealing e⁄ect in action in our
model. Finally, there is no production in our model, hence marginal cost of production is
zero. Since the equilibrium market price is above zero (marginal cost) in the model then
condition (3) is satis￿ed. Hence, there is excessive entry in the model, also driven by a
business stealing e⁄ect. However, it is not the entire reason why we ￿nd excessive entry.
Under free entry, sellers do not consider the social impact of a change in concentration on
the optimal advertising rate as evidenced by a higher marginal social cost of entry compared
to the marginal private cost. There is therefore a negative externality associated with entry
via the business stealing e⁄ect that is not internalized by the equilibrium market price and
advertising rate.
The implications of Propositions 6 and 7 suggest that too many sellers, each not adver-
tising enough, is a feature of the free entry equilibrium. If an entity was to intervene in the
free entry market to implement e¢ cient outcomes, both advertising and entry need to be
targeted. Combining a tax on entry raising the set up cost, and an advertising rate subsidy
25would reduce entry and increase the individual advertising rate. The question of course
remains about the feasibility of such a set of policy instruments in term of balanced budget.
It can be shown that there exist a combination of an entry tax (￿) and an advertising rate
subsidy (￿) which implements e¢ cient outcomes within a balanced budget. Under balanced




;￿) = 0, or ￿ = ￿a￿(￿
￿
;￿), which is evaluated
at the targeted entry ￿
￿
. However, free entry under such policy, call it ￿
￿￿ is determined by
￿(￿
￿￿) = 0 or
R(￿
￿￿) = (￿ ￿ ￿)a
￿(￿
￿￿;￿) + F + ￿:










budget. Hence the equivalent entry tax is ￿￿￿ = ￿￿￿a￿(￿
￿￿;￿￿￿). An example of such policy
combination is highlighted in the numerical examples section below.
Although the model is highly stylized, there seem to exist markets in which such a
combination of policy instruments are used. The assumptions of the model is very conducive
for specialized labor markets whereby each ￿rms have one vacancy, workers search for one job,
and advertising is informative in nature. Entry tax through required costly accreditations
or licensing and subsidized advertising appear to be a feature is many such markets. The
US Veterinary Medical Board seem to be one such example, managing entry via licensing
practices and subsidize advertising through magazines, web sites, newsletters, etc.
4 Numerical Examples
In this section we provide numerical examples of the model in order to highlight the ca-
pabilities and properties of the model, along with an illustration of quantitative aspects of
the theoretical implications. We present values for some of the endogenous variables for
di⁄erent values of exogenous variables and parameters. But of course the same can done for
all endogenous variables.
First of all, ￿nd that equilibrium free entry and advertising rates are invariant in the
number of consumers.16 Therefore we set arbitrarily the number of consumers at N = 100000.
For simplicity and to make a further property of the outcomes evident, we consider extreme
values of advertising costs parameters, that is, we set ￿ = F = :1 and ￿ = F = :8.
The individual pro￿t maximizing and e¢ cient advertising rates for di⁄erent market con-
centration values are shown in Figure 1 for the di⁄erent advertising costs.
16The number of consumers however a⁄ect proportionally the equilibrium number of advertisements sent
and the endogenous variables without free entry.
26Figure 1: Individual pro￿t maximizing and e¢ cient advertising rates
where a￿(￿;￿ = F = :1) refers to pro￿t maximizing advertising rate
under set up and marginal advertising costs being 0:1, etc.
Figure 1 highlights the extent of underadvertising for values of ￿, and illustrates the
implications that advertising rates declines with costs. As the market gets to extremes, that
is relatively more concentrated and relatively low concentration, equilibrium and e¢ cient
rates converge, but the extent of ine¢ cient advertising rate is maximized when ￿ = 1.
Figure 2 shows the extent of ine¢ ciency of industry advertising rates.
27Figure 2: Industry pro￿t mazimizing and e¢ cient advertising rates.
The ￿gure not only highlights the extent of underadvertising at the industry level and
how costs a⁄ect those rates, but also the result that e¢ cient industry rate is not unimodal
in concentration. This implies that the equilibrium industry advertising rate converges to
the e¢ cient level only when ￿ gets large, and the extent of ine¢ cient advertising rate for
the industry is maximized when ￿ ! 0. Finally, Figure 3 shows how costs a⁄ect equilibrium
and e¢ cient entry, ￿
￿ and ￿
o. Figure 3 shows that in this model, higher advertising ￿xed
cost increases ￿
￿ and ￿
o, and hence reduces entry, but also that the di⁄erence between ￿
￿
and ￿
o increases with cost and then decrease again, suggesting that there is an advertising



















= 0:95 0:3472 0:8101 1:5388 101263:64 170980:90 52971:86 59520:52




= 5:10 0:9062 0:0986 0:0381 2664:77 747:65 2537:62 733:58
Table 1: Values for the decentralized market
Figure 3: Equilibrium and e¢ cient levels of entry for di⁄erent advertising
costs.
Table 1 below shows equilibrium and e¢ cient entry with some associated endogenous
variables for di⁄erent parameter values of ￿ and F, while N = 100 000.
Before discussing the implications of the numerical example of Table 1, we give an inter-
pretation of the numbers. First, set up and marginal costs in the order of 10% of consumers￿
valuation (which is 1), induces a free entry concentration level of ￿
￿ = 0:75, meaning that
M￿ = 133 333 sellers enter to serve 100 000 consumers, while the e¢ cient level calls for
Mo = 105 263 sellers. Each seller under free entry send s￿(￿
￿) = Na￿(￿
￿) = 81010 adver-





) = 153880 advertisements
29each. At the industry level, each consumers receive 101263:64 advertisement in total from the
the 133333 sellers under free entry, while e¢ ciency calls for consumers to receive 170980:9
advertisements from 105263 sellers. The expected number of matches under free entry is
found to be 52973. Hence, 52:9% of consumers are satis￿ed, and since there are 133333
sellers, only 39:73% make a sale. Under e¢ ciency, nearly 60% of consumers are satis￿ed
while 56:5% of sellers make a sale.
For set up and marginal costs in the order of 80% of consumers￿valuation, free entry
induces a concentration of ￿
￿ = 3:7, or M￿ = 27027 sellers enter while the e¢ cient entry
calls for a concentration ￿
￿
= 5:1, or M
￿ = 19607 sellers. Each seller under free entry sends
9860 advertisements, while under e¢ ciency each sends 3810 ads. At the industry level, each
consumer receive nearly 2665 ads from all the 27027 sellers under free entry, while under
e¢ ciency each consumer receives 748 ads only from 19607 sellers. Finally, from the expected
number of matches, 2:53% of consumers are satis￿ed while 9:38% of sellers make a sale under
free entry compared to 0:73% of satis￿ed consumers and 3:74% of sellers making a sale under
e¢ ciency.
Table 1 highlights the implication that the extent of excessive entry is less important for
low costs of advertising. However, as shown in ￿gure 3, the extent of excessive entry peaks
for intermediate values of advertising costs. The interesting features in Table 1 are that the
di⁄erence between free entry individual and industry advertising rates and e¢ cient ones are
reverse going from low to high advertising costs. The same holds for the expected number
of matched. For low advertising costs, the free entry equilibrium allocation calls for lower
advertising rates than the e¢ cient ones. Therefore one would observe larger number of sellers,
each advertising less relative to sellers under e¢ cient entry. However, for high advertising
costs, it is reversed. One would observe larger number of sellers, each advertising more
relative to sellers under e¢ cient entry. It can be shown that there exists a set of advertising
costs such that sellers choose the same advertising rate under free entry equilibrium as sellers
under e¢ cient entry. Once again, this example shows that one cannot simply assess e¢ ciency
of advertising without considering market concentration.
Finally, we present an example of how the use of a combination of policy instruments can
induce free entry to be e¢ cient and yield e¢ cient advertising rate. This is shown in Figure
4 below.
30Figure 4: Example of policy instrument values generating e¢ ciency under
free entry.
The curve identi￿ed MPC￿(￿ = F = :8;￿ = :6182;￿ = :126) is the marginal private cost
under the policy instrument values. In this case, for set up and marginal cost of advertising
of 0:8, an entry tax of 0:126 raising the set up cost to 0:926 and an advertising rate subsidy of
0:6182 reducing the marginal cost of advertising to 0:1818 would induce the entry equilibrium
to be e¢ cient, ￿
￿￿ = ￿






This paper constructs a matching model of directly informative advertising and price featur-
ing capacity constrained sellers and hence contributes to the small literature on multi-￿rm
informative advertising models. We ￿nd that the relationship between market concentration
and both, individual and industry advertising rates are unimodal (inverted U-shape). These
￿ndings have signi￿cant empirical support as documented in Bagwell (2003) but almost inex-
istent theoretical underpinnings. The ￿ndings in this paper o⁄er one theoretical explanation.
The model also allow a more detailed analysis of the relationship between advertising rate
and market price. The literature in economics and marketing has focused on explaining a
31negative association between advertising and market prices, arguing that more ads increase
consumers￿sensitivity to price changes translating into lower prices. However, by placing
this association in perspective with the market concentration, we ￿nd that for relatively low
concentration industries, increases in market price brought about by an increased in concen-
tration creates a positive association between advertising rate and the market price, yielding
more ads per seller, and more ads in the industry. On the other hand, for relatively high con-
centration industries, an increase in concentration leads to a negative association. Empirical
studies in the 70￿ s and early 80￿ s considering the eye glasses, eye exams and prescription
medicines have concluded a negative association between advertising and prices.17 Since
the nature of advertising for these items are more on the informative side, and during that
period, those industries were relatively concentrated, this may also provide some support for
our ￿ndings. Contrary to some previous ￿ndings, we obtain that individual and industry
pro￿t maximizing advertising rates are ine¢ cient and entry is excessive. Using numerical
examples, we show how the equilibrium free entry allocation may di⁄er from the e¢ cient
one and how it depends on advertising costs. Finally, we conclude by showing how a tax on
entry and an advertising rate subsidy can induce the free entry equilibrium to be e¢ cient
within a balanced budget.
The model has a direct application to the labor market where sellers can be viewed
as ￿rms, each with one vacancy and consumers as unemployed workers, each searching for
one job. In such market, advertising is highly informative in nature, so the model shows
how search intensity by ￿rms (advertising rate) a⁄ects the market outcomes including the
endogenous matching rate.
Several directions for further research include, but not limited to, assuming di⁄erent pric-
ing mechanisms such as auctions or bidding instead of price posting; allowing for di⁄erent
capacities as in Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) and Deneckere and Peck (1995); allowing for
consumers to choose only over a subset of ￿rms from which they have observed advertise-
ments; and allowing for intermediaries to form. Finally, a dynamic version would warrant
new results, and in a labor market application such as Julien, Kennes and King (2000), it
could be discovered how a more compelling equilibrium unemployment rate would be a⁄ected
by recruitment intensity. Finally, we have focused on directly informative advertising, how-
ever, the structure of the model is rich enough to incorporate the indirectly informative and
persuasive advertising views, by introducing a variable a⁄ecting consumers￿values directly.
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